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COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO v. SS ZOE 
COLOCOTRONI: STATE ACTIONS FOR DAMAGE TO 
NON-COMMERCIAL LIVING NATURAL RESOURCES 
Kevin T. Grady* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On March 15, 1973 the SS Zoe Colocotroni,1 a tramp oil tanker, set 
sail from La Salina, Venezuela with a cargo of 187,670 barrels of 
crude oil. 2 The ship was bound for Guayanilla, Puerto Rico. During 
the first two days out, the Colocotroni proceeded by celestial naviga-
tion. A star fix taken at 6:59 p.m. on March 17, established the ship's 
position as approximately eighty to eighty-five miles due south of 
Puerto Rico. For the next eight hours the Colocotroni proceeded by 
dead reckoning.3 As the ship approached the coast of Puerto Rico, 
the ship's Captain, Anastacios Michalopaulos, was unable to fix the 
Colocotroni's position. Hopelessly lost, he decided to backtrack. As 
the ship turned around, however, it ran aground on a reef three and 
a half miles off the Puerto Rican coast.4 Efforts to refloat the vessel 
• Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1. Hereinafter "Colocotroni." 
2. The description of the events leading up to the oil spill is taken from the district and cir-
cuit court opinions, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327 
(D.P.R. 1978), a!fd in part, vacated in part, remanded, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS 
Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 49 U.S.L.W. 3617 (Feb. 24, 1981). 
3. "Dead reckoning" is a form of navigation in which the position of a craft is determined by 
projecting from a previous to a new position on the basis of direction of motion and distance 
traveled. A compass is used to indicate direction, while distance is usually determined indirect-
ly by measurement of speed and time. 
Generally, dead reckoning includes an allowance for estimated effects of wind and current; 
however, many marine navigators prefer to use course steered and estimated speed through 
the water (without allowance for wind effect) for their dead reckoning, considering positions 
determined by allowance for estimated effects of wind and current as merely "estimated posi-
tions." 4 McGRAW-HILL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 18-21 (1960). 
4. The exact time and location of the grounding was 0300 hours on March 18 at latitude 
17° 55' north, longitude 67°07' west. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 
F. Supp. 1327, 1333 (D.P.R. 1978). 
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by "rocking" it were ineffective.5 After ten minutes the captain 
decided to lighten the ship by dumping part of its cargo.6 By the time 
the Colocotroni refloated, some 5,170.1 tons of crude oil or about 1.5 
million gallons, were jettisoned into the Caribbean Sea. 
The prevailing current off southwestern Puerto Rico carried the 
oil slick, which measured about one tenth of a mile wide by four miles 
long, westward. The oil came ashore at an isolated peninsula called 
Bahia Sucia.7 
Bahia Sucia is a half-moon shaped bay in the extreme southwest-
ern part of Puerto Rico. The distance from point to point across the 
mouth of the Bay is approximately two miles, while the length of the 
beach is about four miles.8 The shoreline is composed mostly of rocky 
limestone extending to the water's edge, with some fringe coral. 
However, along the shore there are two mangrove swamps.9 
The district court found that the factors which directly contributed to the ship's crew becom-
ing hopelessly lost and grounding the ship were: "the lack of proper charts on board, the 
failure of the master [Captain Michalopaulosl to properly compensate for a westerly set in the 
current, inoperative or defective navigation equipment, the failure to post a bow lookout, and 
an incompetent crew." ld. 
5. "Rocking" involves alternately running the engine full foreward and back. ld. 
6. ld. Captain Michalopaulos was subsequently tried and convicted on a charge of violating 
33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5) (1976), for failing to notify the United States government of a discharge 
of oil or hazardous substance into navigable waters. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe 
Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1333 n.9 (D.P.R. 1978). 
7. ld. Bahia Sucia literally means "Dirty Bay." Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe 
Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652,659 n.7 (1st Cir. 1980). It was so named because due to its location 
and configuration, as well as by reason of the prevailing winds and currents, the Bay collects 
and traps much debris along its shores. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 
456 F. Supp. 1327, 1339 (D.P.R. 1978). Nevertheless, the district court found that at the time 
of the Colocotroni oil spill, "Bahia Sucia was a healthy, functioning esturial ecosystem .... " 
ld. 
8. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1337 (D.P.R. 
1978). The district court included a map of Bahia Sucia as an appendix to its opinion. ld. at 
1353. 
9. ld. at 1337-38. 'Ine mangrove swamp on the northeast side of Bahia Sucia will be referred 
to as the "East Mangrove," and the swamp on the west side as the "West Mangrove." These 
are not official names; rather they are labels that were given by the district court for easy 
reference. These labels were used by the circuit court, and will be used in this article. 
These mangrove swamps were the only areas in which the oil slick destroyed natural 
resources, namely mangrove trees and various species of marine organisms which lived among 
the root systems of the mangroves. The district court described the Bahia Sucia mangrove 
areas as follows: 
The mangrove that borders on the ocean fringe throughout Bahia Sucia is a species 
referred to as red mangrove (Rhizophora mangle). This mangrove has both main and 
prop roots, in which are located lenticels or pores for gas exchange. These lenticels 
facilitate root respiration. Various epibenthic species such as tree oysters, snails, 
crabs, sponges and mollusks dwelled in these root systems. [Court's footnote 29: In-
cluded were annelids (Polychaete families of several types), arthropods (A mphipoda, 
Cirripedia, Decapods[Brachyrhyncha, Majidae and Carideaj, lsopoda, Tanaidacea), 
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When the oil spill reached Bahia Sucia it apparently caused con-
siderable harm to the swampland. Most affected was the area in and 
around the West Mangrove,lO as "the mangrove root communities in 
that area were decimated."l! In the aftermath of the spill, mangrove 
mortality was significantly increased, and there was a sizable decline 
in the number of marine organisms in the area. l2 It was for this 
damage to its living natural resources that the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico and its principal environmental agency, the En-
vironmental Quality Board (EQB)13 sought recovery.l4 They filed 
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Puerto 
Rico. l5 
coelenterates (Hydrozoa), mollusks (Bivalvia, Gastropoda, and Aspidobranchia), 
sponges (Porifera, encrusting tan sponge), chordates (Tunicata, colonial and solitary; 
and fish larvae), algae (Bostrichia sp., Filamentous Types A, Band C, Caulerpa 
racemosa, Red Filamentous Type C), roundworms (Nematode - Type A)] . . . . The 
bottom around the roots was inhabited by various benthic infauna. [Court's footnote 
30: Included were annelids (Polychaete families of several types), roundworms 
(Nematoda), arthropods (Amphipoda and Isopoda), coelenterates (Anthozoa), 
echinoderms (Ophuiroidea), mollusks (Bivalvia, Gastropoda, and Aspidolbranchia), 
ribbonworms (Nemertinea), and sponges (Porifera)] .... 
Further inland from the fringe, as the interstitial salinity rises, the red mangrove is 
supplanted by the black mangrove (Avecennia nitida). This mangrove inhabits a zone 
systematically flooded by the tide, and rather than prop roots, it has fingerlike 
breathing tubes (called neumatafors) which rise from the ground to above high water 
level. This area provided a habitat principally for crustaceans such as crabs and bar-
nacles, and algae-grazing snails, bees and reptiles. There were also benthic infaunal 
communities similar in nature to those in the bottom surrounding the red mangrove 
fringe. 
Id. at 1338. 
10. Id. at 1344. The district court limited its discussion of damages to the West Mangrove 
area, holding that the plaintiffs failed to support their claims for damages to the East 
Mangrove.Id. 
11. Id. 
12.Id. 
13. The EQB was created by statute in 1970, and is composed of three associate members 
appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 12 § 
1129 (Supp. 1979). Its functions include: carrying out research, inspections and analyses 
related to the ecological system (P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 12 § 1131(5) (1977»; developing and 
recommending to the Governor of Puerto Rico the public policy on environmental matters (Id. 
§ 1131(4»; and conducting hearings on matters concerning the environment, at which it can 
compel the appearance of witnesses and the presentation of documents (Id. § 1134). The 
EQB's duties, powers, functions, etc., are set out in full at id. §§ 1131-1141. 
14. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its EQB sought damages in three areas: (1) 
destruction of mangrove trees; (2) destruction of marine organisms living in and around the 
mangroves (see note 9, supra, for a list of these organisms); and (3) cleanup costs. The cleanup 
costs were not disputed by the defendants, and will not be dealt with in this article. 
15. Defendants in this action were: the SS Zoe Colocotroni "in rem," her owners - Mar-
bonanzo Compania Naviera, S.A., and/or Colocotroni Ltd. and/or Colocotroni Brothers, S.A., 
and their underwriters - the West of England Ship Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity 
400 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 9:397 
The case of Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni,16 
raised a number of important issues, both procedural and substan-
tiveY This article will focus on the two major environmental issues 
raised by Zoe Colocotroni: (1) whether a state18 has the right to bring 
suit to recover damages for harm to living natural resources which it 
does not own; and (2) how damages should be assessed when the 
marine organisms and other natural resources that are destroyed 
have no commercial or market value, and in fact are not utilized or 
enjoyed by anyone. In dealing with the first issue, the opinions of the 
district and circuit courts will be examined; and there will be an in-
depth analysis of one of the unanswered questions of Zoe Colo-
cotroni: whether a state has a common law right to bring suit for 
damages when living natural resources that it does not own are 
destroyed. This analysis will involve an examination of the concepts 
of "proprietary interest," "trustee of the public trust," and "parens 
patriae." In dealing with the issue of damage assessment, the opin-
ions of the district and circuit courts will be discussed in detail, and in 
the process, this article will outline an equitable approach to damage 
assessment for harm to non-commercial living natural resources. 
Association (Luxembourg) and the West of England Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Associa-
tion (London) Limited. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 
1327, 1331 (D.P.R. 1978). 
A number of other suits also arose as the result of this oil spill. The United States recovered 
$840,366.01 in cleanup costs, interest, and statutory penalties against the ship's owners. [d. at 
1345-52, affd, 602 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1979). Local fishermen settled their claim for property 
damage and loss of income for $55,000. Owners of an abutting salt pond settled their claim for 
loss of income for $75,000. A nearby hotel settled its claim for riparian damages and loss of 
business for $13,500. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 656 
n.1 (1st Cir. 1980). A claim by the owners of the discharged petroleum was also settled for an 
undisclosed amount. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 
1331 n.1 (D. P.R. 1978). 
16. Hereinafter "Zoe Colocotroni." 
17. It is beyond the scope of this article to deal with all of the issues raised in the suit. Those 
issues presented which will not be discussed here include: (1) a claim by defendants that 
federal subsidization of plaintiffs suit constituted improper maintenance; (2) a claim by defend-
ants that the district court abused its discretion by striking their pleadings and defenses, and 
precluding them from presenting any evidence at trial on issues of liability; and (3) a claim by 
defendants that Puerto Rico lacked personal jurisdiction over the West of England Ship 
Owners Mutual Protection and Indemnity Association (Luxembourg) and the West of England 
Ship Owners Mutual Insurance Association (London) Limited. 
18. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico is a "territory" rather than a "state" of the United 
States. However, it is a sovereignty organized within the legal and political framework of the 
United States (see 48 U.S.C. SS 731-916 (1976); P.R. CONST.; P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 1 (1965»; and 
it possesses many of the attributes of a "state." Ursulick v. P.R. National Guard, 384 F. Supp. 
736 (D.P.R. 1974). The legal issues raised by Zoe Colocotroni which are dealt with in this arti-
cle have equal applicability to the "states" of the United States. 
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II. THE RIGHT OF A STATE TO BRING SUIT TO RECOVER DAMAGES 
FOR HARM TO LIVING NATURAL RESOURCES WHICH IT DOES NOT OWN 
At the outset, it must be noted that the Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico did own the Bahia Sucia swampland which was harmed by the 
oil spill. Ie Thus, the Commonwealth, like any landowner, had the 
right to bring an admiralty action to recover damages for the harm 
done to its land.20 Not surprisingly, the Commonwealth chose not to 
pursue this course of action. Its decision was no doubt prompted by 
the fact that the damaged land was worth very little.21 Instead, the 
Commonwealth sought relief "under an asserted right to recover as 
a governmental entity on behalf of its people for the loss of living 
natural resources on the land such as trees and animals."22 
While there is little doubt that Puerto Rico owned the mangrove 
trees on its land and therefore could recover damages for their 
destruction, there is equally little doubt that Puerto Rico did not own 
the marine organisms which merely happened to live in the swamp.23 
The defendants in Zoe Colocotroni argued that since Puerto Rico did 
not own the damaged marine organisms, it was not entitled to 
recover damages for their destruction. U The following section will 
examine how the district and circuit courts dealt with this issue. 
A. The District Court's Opinion and the Circuit Court's Opinion 
The parties and district court Judge Juan Torruella, phrased the 
issue in terms of whether Puerto Rico and its EQB had "standing" 
to recover for damages to living natural resources.25 The court held 
19. See 48 U.S.C. S 749 (1976). Under this Act, the United States transferred to Puerto Rico 
all the interest it had in "[t]he harbor areas and navigable streams and bodies of water and 
submerged lands underlying the same in and around the island of Puerto Rico. . . ." [d. 
20. It is well established that the owner of property has a right to sue for damages when his 
property is harmed by a wrongdoer. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOm» OF TORTS S 871 (inten-
tional harm to property) and S 822(b), Comments i and k (negligent harm to property) (1979); 
and C. McCORMICK, HAm>BOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES 165 (1935). Furthermore, there would 
be no jurisdictional problems with such a suit by Puerto Rico. See 46 U.S.C. S 740 (1976). 
21. Defendants introduced evidence at triaJ that property in the vicinity of Bahia Sucia had 
been sold at prices ranging from $3,000 to $5,670 per acre. Post Trial Brief of Defendants at 
33, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327 (D.P.R. 1978). 
22. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 670-71 (1st Cir. 
1980). 
23. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). For a discussion of Puerto Rico's "pro-
prietary interest," or lack thereof, in the marine organisms, see text at notes 50-66 infra. 
24. Brief for Appellant at 57-59, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 
F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980). 
25. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1336-37 
(D.P.R. 1978). Perhaps the best description of the concept of standing is a passage from 
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that Puerto Rico did have "standing" to bring suit because it had a 
"proprietary interest" in the damaged natural resources,26 and 
because it was the "trustee of the public trust" in these resources.27 
Additionally, the court ruled that Puerto Rico could maintain the suit 
in its capacity as "parens patriae."28 The district court did not 
devote much time to an analysis of Puerto Rico's right to bring suit, 
however. The court's discussion of this difficult issue is basically con-
clusory, and not very helpful. 
The district court's holding with regard to the EQB was equally 
summary, though with better reason. Dealing with the issue in one 
sentence, the court held that the EQB had standing to sue for en-
vironmental damages on the basis of its enabling statute.29 Given the 
Carolina Environmental Study Group v. United States, 431 F. Supp. 203 (D.N.C. 1977), where 
the court said that standing is "a requirement that the plaintiffs have been injured or be 
threatened with injury; . . . [it] focuses upon the litigant and raises the question whether the 
litigant is the proper party to fight the lawsuit, not the question whether the issue itself is 
justiciable." [d. at 218-19. The Supreme Court has said that standing is a question of whether 
the plaintiff has "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure 
that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so 
largely depends for illumination of difficult ... questions .... " Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 
186, 204 (1962). 
26. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1337 (D.P.R. 
1978) citing State of Maine v. MlV Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097, 1098-99 (D. Me. 1973), State, 
Department of Fish & Game v. SS Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922, 926-30 (C.D. Cal. 1969). 
27. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1337 (D.P.R. 
1978), citing Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 534 (1859); State of Maryland, Department of 
Natural Resources v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1065-67 (D. Md. 1972); State 
Department of Environmental Protection v. Jersey Central Power & Light Co., 124 N.J. 
Super. 97, 308 A.2d 671 (1973). 
28. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1337 (D.P.R. 
1978), citing Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208, 241 (1901); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 
(1900); Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper 
Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Maine v. MN Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Me. 1973). 
The issue of Puerto Rico's right to bring suit, and the doctrines of "proprietary interest," 
"trustee of the public trust," and "parens patriae," are discussed in greater detail in the text 
at notes 50-113 infra. 
29. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1337 (D.P.R. 
1978). The enabling statute, P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 12 § 1131(29) (1977), states that the EQB has 
power: 
To bring, represented by the Secretary of Justice, by the Board's attorneys, or by a 
private attorney contracted for such purpose, civil actions for damages in any court of 
Puerto Rico or the United States of America to recover the total value ofthe damages 
caused to the environment and/or natural resources upon committing any violation of 
this chapter and its regulations. The amount of the judgment collected to such effect 
shall be covered into the Special Account of the Board on Environmental Quality. 
The district court also noted that the EQB could not recover damages separate and apart from 
the Commonwealth. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 
1337 (D.P.R. 1978). 
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explicit language of the enabling statute, it is clear that the EQB did 
have the right to bring suit in Zoe Colocotroni. 
The cir~it court, on the other hand, engaged in considerably more 
legal analysis of the issue of the Commonwealth's and the EQB's 
right to bring suit. First, the court stated that it believed the issue 
was more properly a question of whether the plaintiffs' claim stated 
a "cognizable cause of action," than whether the plaintiffs had 
"standing."30 Citing Davis v. Passman31 the circuit court deter-
mined that the plaintiffs' Article III standing was not in question: 
"assuming plaintiffs have a valid cause of action, they clearly are the 
proper parties to raise it."32 The court did not, however, explain its 
reasoning on this point. 
Although the circuit court's discussion of the matter is brief and 
somewhat confusing, the court's conclusion appears correct. The 
issue here is whether the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico can bring 
suit for damages for harm to marine organisms which lived on its 
land, but which technically it did not own.33 There are three related 
legal concepts which are involved in this issue: standing, cause of ac-
tion, and right of action. These concepts are "among the most amor-
phous in the entire domain of public law,"34 and it is beyond the 
scope of this article to analyze them in-depth. For present purposes 
it is sufficient to note that standing is basically a question of whether 
the plaintiff is the proper party to raise a claim.36 A party is granted 
standing when a court determines that the party "has a sufficient 
stake in an otherwise justiciable controversy to obtain judicial resolu-
30. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652,670 (1st Cir. 1980). 
31. 442 U.S. 228 (1979). In Davis v. Passman, the Supreme Court rather unhelpfully 
distinguished "standing" from "cause of action" as follows: 
[s ]tanding is a question of whether a plaintiff is sufficiently adversary to a defendant 
to create an Article III case or controversy, or at least to overcome prudential limita· 
tions on federal-court jurisdiction . . . . {C]ause of action is a question of whether a 
particular plaintiff is a member of the class of litigants that may, as a matter of law, 
appropriately invoke the power of the court. Id. at 239-40 n.18. 
32. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 670 n.19 (1st Cir. 
1980). 
33. The question whether Puerto Rico "owned" or had a "proprietary interest" in the 
marine organisms, is discussed in the text at notes 50-66 infra. At present it is sufficient to 
note that the case of Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), establishes that the Com-
monwealth did not have an ownership or proprietary interest in the marine organisms. 
34. Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for 
Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 425 n.1 (1974), quoting, Hearings on S. 2097 Before the 
Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d 
Sess., pt. 2 at 498 (1966) (statements of Prof. Paul Freund on "standing"). 
35. See note 25 supra. For a thoughtful and interesting discussion of the concept of stand-
ing, see Albert, supra note 34. 
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tion of that controversy."S6 Cause of action can be defined as a 
"situation or state of facts which would entitle a party to sustain an 
action and give him the right to seek judicial interference in his 
behalf."s7 Not every act or occurrence entitles a party to institute a 
judicial proceeding; thus, a cause of action is the fact or facts which 
give a party a right to judicial relief. A right of action is "a right 
presently to enforce a cause of action by suit,"S8 or more simply, the 
legal right to sue. Thus, a cause of action, and standing, are 
necessary elements of a right of action. 
In Zoe Colocotroni, the question whether Puerto Rico could bring 
suit for damages has elements of both a standing and a cause of ac-
tion problem. However, since living natural resources of ecological 
value were destroyed by the Colocotroni oil spill, S9 it appears that the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico suffered an injury sufficient to meet 
the Article III "case or controversy" standing requirement. More-
over, it certainly could not be argued that there is any other party 
more adverse who could bring suit for the destruction of the marine 
organisms. The organisms lived on land which Puerto Rico owned, 
and the Commonwealth certainly has an interest in seeing to it that 
polluters who harm those resources pay for that harm. To be sure, it 
has been held that the mere fact that there is no other party "more 
adverse" than the plaintiff is not dispositive on the issue of 
standing.40 However, a more illuminating view is that once it is 
determined that there is no other party more adverse than the plain-
tiff, then the court's inquiry on the plaintiff s right to bring suit is ac-
tually focused on the question whether the plaintiff has a cause of ac-
tion.41 Under this approach, it is clear that in Zoe Colocotroni, the 
issue of Puerto Rico's right to sue for damages is a cause of action 
issue rather than a standing issue.42 Phrased accordingly the issue is: 
36. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731 (1972). This is the threshold "case or con· 
troversy" requirement of Article III of the Constitution. 
37. Thompson v. Zurich Insurance Company, 309 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (D. Minn. 1970), 
citing Rhodes v. Jones, 351 F.2d 884,886 (8th Cir. 1965). 
38. McMahon v. United States, 186 F.2d 227,230 (3rd Cir. 1950). 
39. See text at note 102 infra. 
40. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974). The Court in Richardson held 
that the absence of any party more adverse than the plaintiff was not sufficient reason to find 
standing. Id. at 179. 
41. Albert, supra note 34, argues that standing should be viewed as being concerned with 
components of a cause of action. 
42. It must be emphasized that this is only one approach to the problem. One could argue 
persuasively that the issue of Puerto Rico's right to bring suit is a standing problem. However, 
the resolution of this substantive issue would not be determined by the label that one pins on it. 
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does Puerto Rico (or any state) have a cause of action when living 
natural resources which it does not own are destroyed? 
The plaintiffs in Zoe Colocotroni claimed that Puerto Rico's regula-
tory interest in its living natural resources, expressed metaphori-
cally in the Commonwealth's status as "public trustee" of the 
resources,43 gave rise to a cause of action. The defendants argued 
that the Commonwealth was not the public trustee of the marine 
organisms, and that even if it were, its status would not support a 
cause of action.44 Unfortunately, the circuit court did not resolve this 
issue. The court concluded that it did not have to decide whether the 
Commonwealth had a cause of action, because it found that the EQB 
did.46 Citing the EQB's enabling statute,46 the circuit court stated 
"[w]e read this statute both as creating a cause of action of the type 
described by its terms and as designating the EQB as the proper par-
ty to bring such an action."47 The court continued, 
[w]hatever might be the case in the absence of such a local 
statute, we think that where the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
has thus legislatively authorized the bringing of suits for 
environmental damages, and has earmarked funds so recovered 
to a special fund, such an action must be construed as taking the 
place of any implied common law action the Commonwealth, as 
trustee, might have brought. Any other construction would in-
vite the risk of double recovery and lead to confusion as to the 
rights of the two state plaintiffs in their identical or nearly iden-
tical actions. It is unnecessary, therefore, for us to consider 
whether, had the legislature of Puerto Rico not delegated to the 
EQB the right to maintain such suits, the Commonwealth would 
have an inherent right to bring them itself.48 
Thus, the circuit court held that the cause of action granted to the 
EQB in its enabling statute was intended to replace any common law 
cause of action which might have existed prior to its enactment, and 
that this statutory cause of action precluded the bringing of any ac-
tion at common law. However, the circuit court did not resolve the 
question whether, in the absence of a statutory cause of action, a 
43. The doctrine of "trustee of the public trust" is discussed in the text at notes 67-91 infra. 
44. Brief for Appellants at 59-60, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 
F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980); and Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 
652, 671 (1st Cir. 1980). 
45. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 671-72 (1st Cir. 
1980). 
46. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 12 § 1131(29) (1977). This statute is set out in full at note 29 supra. 
47. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 671-72 (1st Cir. 
1980). 
48. [d. at 672. 
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state would have a common law cause of action to recover for en-
vironmental damages to living natural resources which it does not 
own. The following section seeks to answer that question. 
B. The Unanswered Question: Does a State Have a Common 
Law Cause of Action? 
The district court in Zoe Colocotroni held that Puerto Rico could 
maintain its suit: (1) because it had a "proprietary interest" in the 
damaged natural resources; (2) because it was the "trustee of the 
public trust" in these resources; a.nd (3) in its capacity as "parens 
patriae."49 In order to determine whether a state has a common law 
cause of action these three doctrines must be examined in detail. 
1. Proprietary Interest 
"Proprietary interest" is defined as "the interest of an owner of 
property together with all rights appurtenant thereto."5o In essence, 
proprietary interest is synonymous with ownership. It is a basic max-
im of tort law that a property owner can sue to recover damages 
when his property is harmed by a wrongdoer. 51 Thus, if a state could 
show that it had a proprietary interest in its living natural resources, 
it would have a cause of action when those resources were damaged. 
A survey of the case law reveals that early Supreme Court cases 
did describe a state's interest in its wildlife and natural resources as 
"ownership." In Geer v. Connecticut, 52 the Supreme Court upheld 
the validity of a Connecticut ordinance which prohibited the killing of 
certain fowl for purposes of conveying the animals beyond state 
lines. In reaching its conclusion the court characterized the state's 
interest in terms of "ownership," although the court noted that the 
state had an obligation to exercise its ownership "as a trust for the 
benefit of the people."53 Similarly, in La Coste v. Department ofCon-
servation,54 the court stated that wild animals were "owned by the 
state in its sovereign capacity for the common benefit of all its 
people." 55 
49. See text at notes 25-28 supra. 
50. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1098 (5th ed. 1979). 
51. See note 20 supra. 
52. 161 U.S. 519 (1896). 
53. [d. at 529. 
54. 263 U.S. 545 (1924). 
55. [d. at 549. 
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However, later cases have rejected the notion of state 
"ownership" of living natural resources. The majority in Toomer v. 
Witsell 56 stated: "The whole ownership theory, in fact, is now 
generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of 
the importance to its people that a state have power to preserve and 
regulate the exploitation of an important resource."57 Recently, in 
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 58 the Court came full circle and formally over-
ruled Geer v. Connecticut, thus laying to rest for good the theory of 
state "ownership" of wildlife and natural resources. In Hughes, the 
Court struck down a state law which prohibited the interstate trans-
portation of wildlife lawfully caught in the state. However, while ex-
pressly overruling Geer, the Court recognized that states retain an 
important interest in the regulation and conservation of living 
natural resources: "the general rule we adopt in this case makes am-
ple allowance for preserving, in ways not inconsistent with the Com-
merce Clause, the legitimate state concerns for conservation and 
protection of wild animals underlying the 19th Century legal fiction 
of state ownership."59 Hughes thus makes clear that a state has an 
important interest in its living natural resources, but the interest 
does not rise to the level of ownership.60 
In Zoe Colocotroni, the plaintiffs and the district court relied prin-
cipally on two cases to support the contention that Puerto Rico had a 
proprietary interest in the damaged marine organisms: Maine v. 
MIV Tamano,61 and State, Department of Fisk and Game v. SS 
Bournemoutk. 62 Neither of these cases, though, is convincing prece-
dent on the issue of a state's "proprietary interest" in marine 
organisms. 
In Tamano, the State of Maine brought suit seeking damages for 
injury to its waters and marine life resulting from an oil spill. The 
56. 334 u.s. 385 (1948). 
57. [d. at 402. 
58. 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
59. [d. at 335-36. 
60. The majority in Hughes stated: "We consider the States' interest in conservation and 
protection of wild animals as legitimate local purposes similar to the States' interest in protect-
ing the health and safety of their citizens." [d. at 337. 
It must be noted that Hughes was a commerce clause case, and therefore its applicability to 
non-commerce clause cases, such as Zoe Colocotroni, might be questioned. However a fair 
reading of the case seems to indicate that the Court's rejection of the concept of state "owner-
ship" of living natural resources is absolute, and not limited to challenges under the commerce 
clause. 
61. 357 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Me. 1973). 
62. 307 F. Supp. 922 (C.D. Cal. 1969). 
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state's claim for damages was in three categories: (1) in its pro-
prietary capacity the state sought damages for harm to land which it 
owned; (2) in its "parens patriae" capacity the state sought damages 
for harm to its coastal waters and marine life; and (3) cleanup coStS.68 
Tamano involved a motion by the defendants to dismiss the state's 
"parens patriae" claim, and the limited discussion by the court of a 
state's "proprietary capacity" solely concerned land which the State 
of Maine itself owned, not living natural resources.64 Nowhere in 
Tamano does the court indicate that Maine had a "proprietary in-
terest" in marine organisms. 
Bournemouth, involved a suit by the State of California against a 
vessel "in rem" which discharged oil into the navigable waters of the 
state, apparently harming the water itself and marine life. The 
district court held that California's ownership interest in its 
navigable waters and marine life gave rise to a maritime lien on the 
vesse1.66 This decision is of questionable value, however. Not only did 
the court not cite any authority for the proposition that a state owns 
marine animals living off its coast; it did not even treat state owner-
ship as an issue. The court's opinion simply assumed that the State of 
California owned the water and marine life which were damaged. 
Absent some legal support, such an assumption of law is inappro-
priate. 
In any event, to whatever extent Tamano and Bournemouth, do 
stand for the proposition that a state has a proprietary interest in its 
marine organisms, these cases have been overruled by Hughes. The 
Supreme Court in Hughes makes clear that a state's interest in its 
living natural resources cannot be labelled "ownership."66 Thus, a 
state faced with a case like Zoe Colocotroni, where marine organisms 
off its coast are damaged, cannot look to the concept of "proprietary 
interest" as a basis for a cause of action. 
2. Trustee of the Public Trust 
A trust is "a right of property, real or personal, held by one party 
for the benefit of another."67 It is a fiduciary relation with respect to 
property, subjecting the person by whom the property is held, the 
63. Maine v. MlV Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097, 1098-99 (D. Me. 1973). 
64. [d. at 1098 & n.2. 
65. State, Department of Fish & Game v. SS Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922, 926-29 (C.D. 
Cal. 1969). 
66. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 341 (1979). 
67. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1352 (5th ed. 1979). 
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trustee, to equitable duties to deal with the property for the benefit 
of another person, the beneficiary. 68 A trustee has not only the right, 
but also the affirmative fiduciary obligation, to ensure that the 
beneficiary's rights in the trust "corpus" are protected, and to seek 
compensation for any diminution in that trust cOrpUS.69 
A public trust is a trust in which the beneficiaries are the public at 
large.70 One commentator71 has suggested that perhaps the best 
description of the public trust doctrine as it exists in states today, 
was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the 19th century case of Il-
linois Central Railroad v. Illinois. 72 There the Court stated that the 
title to the navigable waters of Lake Michigan held by Illinois was "a 
title held in trust for the people of the state that they may enjoy the 
navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and have 
liberty of fishing therein freed from the obstruction or interference 
of private parties."73 
The plaintiffs in Zoe Colocotroni argued that the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico was the "public trustee" of all the living natural 
resources in the Commonwealth. The damaged marine organisms, 
they asserted, were part of the corpus of the public trust, and 
therefore Puerto Rico had the right and duty to have the corpus 
reimbursed for the diminution attributable to the oil spill.74 Defend-
ants argued that absent a proprietary interest in the resource actual-
ly damaged, a state's unexercised regulatory authority will not sup-
port a proper cause of action.76 Each side was able to cite two lower 
court cases in support of its position. 
The defendants cited Commonwealth v. Agway, Inc., 76 and State v. 
Dickinson Cheese CO.,77 both of which involved damage actions by a 
state against polluters who destroyed fish. In Agway, the court 
found that "the interest of the state (in its marine life) is that of a 
68.Id. 
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, §§ 2 and 177, and S 177 Comment a (1959). 
70. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1355 (5th ed. 1979). For a detailed discussion of the public 
trust doctrine, see Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resources Law: Effective 
Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). 
71. Note, Environmental Law-Public Trust-Injury to Public Trust is Basis for A ward of 
Damages, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 394, 397 (1974). . 
72. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
73. Id. at 452. 
74. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 671 (1st Cir. 1980); 
Brief of Amici Curiae at 11-12, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 
652 (1st Cir. 1980). 
75. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 671 (1st Cir. 1980). 
76. 210 Pa. Super. Ct. 150, 232 A.2d 69 (1967). 
77. 200 N.W. 2d 59 (N.D. 1972). 
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sovereign, not an owner."78 Unable to find that a proprietary in-
terest in living natural resources resided in the state, and looking no 
further, the court ruled that damages could not be recovered.79 The 
court in Dickinson Cheese, relying on Agway, said that a state "does 
not have such property interest in the fish while they are in a wild 
state sufficient to support a civil action for damages for the destruc-
tion of those fish which have not been reduced to possession."80 As in 
Agway, the court in Dickinson Cheese apparently assumed that in the 
absence of a proprietary interest the state could not maintain a civil 
damage suit, and therefore looked no further for a cause of action. 
The problem with these cases, and the reason they are not very 
helpful to the defendants in Zoe Colocotroni, is that in a sense they 
beg the very issue in dispute here. While both Agway and Dickinson 
Cheese hold that a state cannot maintain a damage suit for the 
destruction of fish because it lacks a "proprietary interest" in them, 
neither of these cases discuss the "public trust" doctrine. Perhaps, 
as no doubt the defendants in Zoe Colocotroni would argue, the 
respective judges did not mention the public trust doctrine because 
they did not think a state's status as "trustee" supported a cause of 
action, but this is pure speculation. The fact is, the analysis in both 
cases is limited to a determination of whether or not a state has a 
proprietary interest in its fish. Once the courts answered this ques-
tion in the negative, the suits were dismissed. Thus, neither Agway 
nor Dickinson Cheese are of much precedential weight on the ques-
tion whether the "public trust" doctrine supplies a state with a cause 
of action in environmental damage suits. 
The plaintiffs in Zoe Colocotroni cited Maryland v. Amerada Hess 
COrp.,81 and State v. Jersey Central Power & Light,82 as support for 
their position. In Amerada Hess, the State of Maryland brought suit 
to recover damages for harm to the condition and quality of its 
waters, incurred as a result of an oil discharge into Baltimore Har-
bor. The defendants in that case presented the same defense as that 
asserted by the defendants in Zoe Colocotroni: 
[T]he "trusteeship of the State is merely an expression of the 
State's power to· regulate, and. . . the State, as a mere trustee 
of the waters contained therein, has no proprietary interest in 
78. Commonwealth v. Agway, Inc., 210 Pa. Super. Ct. 150, 153, 232 A.2d 69, 70 (1967). 
79. [d. at 155, 232 A.2d at 71. 
80. State v. Dickinson Cheese Co., 200 N.W.2d 59, 61 (N.D. 1972). 
81. 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1066 (D. Md. 1972). 
82. 125 N.J. Super. Ct. 97, 308 A.2d 671 (1973). 
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said waters, and therefore is not able to bring a common law 
civil suit to redress a wrong done to the waters of the State.SS 
411 
The court agreed that the State of Maryland was a "trustee" 
rather than an "owner" of the damaged waters, but it held: 
The conclusion seems inescapable to this Court, that if the State 
is deemed to be the trustee of the waters, then, as trustee, the 
State must be empowered to bring suit to protect the corpus of 
the trust - i.e., the waters - for the beneficiaries ofthe trust-
i.e., the public.s4 
Using similar reasoning,86 and reaching the same result, the 
district court in Jersey Central Power & Light held: "It would ... 
[be] unreasonable and injudicious to impose the fiduciary duties of a 
trustee upon the State while withholding the ability to have the cor-
pus reimbursed for a diminution attributable to a wrongdoer."86 
The reasoning in these cases is compelling. If a state is indeed a 
"public trustee" of its living natural resources, then surely the state, 
like any trustee, should have the right to recover damages when the 
trust corpus is diminished by a polluter. The only possible argument 
against this conclusion is to assert that a state is not the "public 
trustee" of its natural resources. Defendants in Zoe Colocotroni 
made this claim, arguing that since Geer v. Connecticut87 had 
language indicating that a state was a public trustee, and since 
Hughes v. Oklahoma88 explicitly overruled Geer, then the public trust 
theory could not be used as a basis for recovery of damages to 
marine organisms.89 
This argument is unpersuasive. A close reading of Hughes reveals 
that it overruled Geer insofar as that case held that a state owns the 
living natural resources within its borders.90 Nowhere in Hughes is 
there any mention of the public trust doctrine. The rule of Hughes is 
83. Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1066 (D. Md. 1972). 
84. Id. at 1067. 
85. The reasoning is almost identical, except the court in Jersey Central Power & Light 
equated the state's role as "public trustee" with the concept of "parens patriae." For a discus· 
sion of this point, see Note, supra note 71, at 400-08. 
86. State v. Jersey Central Power & Light, 125 N.J. Super. Ct. 97, 102, 308 A.2d 671, 
673-74 (1973). 
87. 161 U.S. 519 (1896). 
88. 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
89. Brief for Appellant at 59-60, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 
F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980). 
90. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 327-35 (1979). 
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plainly that while a state has an important interest in its living 
natural resources, it does not own them. The public trust doctrine re-
mains unaffected by Hughes. 
To summarize, "states retain an important interest in the regula-
tion and conservation of wildlife and natural resources."91 This in-
terest, while it is not "proprietary," is expressed metaphorically in 
the state's status as public trustee of its natural resources. This in-
terest should be sufficient to support a claim for recovery of 
damages for environmental harm. As trustee, a state should have 
the power to protect the trust corpus (Le., the state's natural 
resources), by instituting regulatory and conservational measures, 
and, if necessary, by bringing suit. The status of a state as "trustee 
of the public trust" should be a basis for a cause of action when the 
state's living natural resources are harmed. 
3. Parens Patriae 
The phrase "parens patriae" literally means "parent of the coun-
try."92 The doctrine developed in England as the King's right to pro-
tect those citizens who were incapable of caring for themselves. 98 
However, in the United States the concept has developed to include 
those situations in which a state seeks compensation for damages to 
its "quasi-sovereign interests,"94 which are separate and apart from 
those injuries suffered individually by its citizens.95 Given this re-
quirement, commentators have noted that there are two situations in 
which a state could probably maintain a "parens patriae" suit: (1) 
where the state itself suffers clear injury, such as its own economy; 
or (2) where the general public suffers an injury that gives no right of 
recovery to anyone individual. 96 
91. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 671 (1st Cir. 1980). 
92. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1003 (5th ed. 1979). 
93. Note, supra note 71, at 401. Among those who were considered at English law to be "in· 
capable of caring for themselves" were idiots and lunatics. Id. at 401 n.66. 
94. The United States is a sovereign nation; thus the individual states are "quasi· 
sovereign." Although there is no definitive list of those interests that may be classified as 
"quasi·sovereign," the courts have identified numerous interests that so qualify, among them, 
the interest in a clean environment, see Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907). 
95. The cases are universal in their requirement that in order for a state to sue in its 
"parens patriae" capacity, it must show injury to its own interests apart from that suffered by 
its inhabitants. See, e.g., Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907); Oklahoma 
ex. reI. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 393 (1938); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 301 F. Supp. 
982,986 (D. Haw. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970), affd 405 U.S. 
251 (1972). 
96. See Note, supra note 71, at 402, and Note, State Protection of Its Economy and Environ-
ment: Parens Patriae Suits for Damages, 6 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 411,413·18 (1970). 
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Plaintiffs in Zoe Colocotroni argued that Puerto Rico's quasi-
sovereign interests in its living natural resources (Le., the important 
regulatory and conservational interests recognized by Hugkes97) 
formed the basis for a cause of action enabling the Commonwealth to 
recover damages for harm to marine organisms.98 According to the 
plaintiffs, the injury to the marine organisms met the second require-
ment listed above, namely an injury to the general public which gives 
no right of recovery to anyone individual. 99 
The defendants in Zoe Colocotroni presented two arguments 
against this asserted right of a "parens patriae" damage suit. First, 
they claimed that the destruction of the marine organisms did not in-
flict injury on anyone, since the organisms were commercially value-
less. loo This argument is unpersuasive, however. While a later sec-
tion of this article discusses in detail the ramifications of the fact that 
the damaged marine organisms had no market value,lOl for now it is 
a sufficient answer to defendants' argument to note that the true 
"worth" of property is not always reflected in its market value. Al-
though the marine organisms which were destroyed by the Colo-
cotroni oil spill were themselves commercially valueless, they were 
vital links in the aquatic food chain, and thus were ecologically valu-
able. l02 Thus, because the destruction of the organisms had a nega-
tive impact on Puerto Rico's living natural resources, the people of 
the Commonwealth did suffer an injury. 
The second argument asserted by the defendants in Zoe Colo-
cotroni was that a state in its "parens patriae" capacity could only 
bring an action for injunctive relief, not damages. loa They correctly 
noted that all but two of the Supreme Court "parens patriae" cases 
were actions solely for injunctive relief, and that in both suits in 
which damages were sought,104 the Court denied recovery. In 
97. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979). 
98. Plaintiff's Brief at 38, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. 
Supp. 1327 (D.P.R. 1978). 
99. [d. at 39. 
100. Brief for Appellants at 55-56, and 60-71, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Col-
ocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980). This argument by the defendants applied to any and all 
causes of action, not solely to the one based on "parens patriae." 
101. See text at notes 114-183 infra. 
102. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1339 (D.P.R. 
1978); Brief of Amici Curiae at 22, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 
F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980). See text at note 177 infra, for a discussion of how this ecological value 
might be measured. 
103. Brief for Appellants at 60, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 
F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980). 
104. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945); Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 
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Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., the State of Georgia brought suit 
seeking injunctive relief and damages against twenty railroad com-
panies that allegedly conspired to fix freight rates which discrimi-
nated against the state. The Supreme Court held that Georgia could 
maintain its "parens patriae" suitl°5 but ruled that the state could 
not recover damages because the allegedly collusive rates had been 
approved by the Interstate Commerce Commission and a damage 
award would have constituted an improper rebate. l06 In Hawaii v. 
Standard Oil Co., the State of Hawaii brought suit seeking damages 
and injunctive relief against four corporations which allegedly 
violated the anti-trust laws of the United States.l07 At issue was a 
motion by the defendants to dismiss the count in which Hawaii 
sought damages in its "parens patriae" capacity.loB The Court, in af-
firming for the defendants, held that the phrase "business or proper-
ty" in section 4 of the Clayton Act did not authorize damages for an 
injury to the general economy of a state. l09 However, although the 
Court denied damages in both of these cases, neither of them can 
fairly be read as standing for the proposition that a state, as "parens 
patriae," cannot sue for damages. A close reading of the two cases 
indicates that the Court did not express any reluctance to the idea of 
awarding damages in a "parens patriae" case. As the district court 
stated in Maine v. MIV Tamano,110 "the plain implication to be 
drawn from both ... [Georgia v. PennsylvaniaR. Co., andHawaii 
v. Standard Oil Co.] is that, absent some substantive bar, the Court 
was willing to allow damages to a state suing as "parens patriae."l1l 
Tamano, incidentally, was the first decision clearly to,permit an 
award of damages under the "parens patriae" doctrine for injury to 
the environment. In rejecting defendants' motion to dismiss the 
U.S. 251 (1972). 
105. Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 450-51 (1945). It should be noted that 
Georgia also brought suit in its "proprietary capacity" as an owner of a railroad. 
106. [d. at 453. 
107. Specifically, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 
U.S. 251, 253 (1972). Hawaii's claim for damage was based on section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 15 (1976), which states: 
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything 
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United 
States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, 
without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the 
damages by him sustained and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
108. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 256-57 (1972). 
109. [d. at 264-66. 
110. 357 F. Supp. 1097 (D. Me. 1973). 
111. [d. at 1101. See Note, supra note 96, at 419-21. 
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count that sought damages under the "parens patriae" doctrine, the 
district court stated: 
If Maine can establish damage to her quasi-sovereign interests 
in her coastal waters and marine life, independent of whatever 
individual damages may have been sustained by her citizens, 
there is no apparent reason why the present action to recover 
such damage cannot be maintained. In the view of this Court, 
the complaint states a viable "parens patriae" cause of ac-
tion .... 112 
In short, there is nothing inherent in the concept of "parens 
patriae" that prevents the awarding of damages. In cases where a 
polluter or other wrongdoer harms a state's living natural resources, 
the state should be able to bring a "parens patriae" suit to recover 
damages for that harm. The requirement of a separate state interest 
should be satisfied because the harm in such cases is to the general 
welfare and thus no one individual has a right to recover. 
To ,summarize, in cases in which living natural resources are 
destroyed, a state should be able to maintain a common law suit for 
damages.113 There are two bases for a cause of action in such cases: 
(1) the state's status as "trustee of the public trust" in the natural 
resources; and (2) the state's capacity as "parens patriae." However, 
having a cause of action and being able to maintain a suit is only half 
the battle. Damages must be assessed, and the difficulty inherent in 
that task will be the subject of the remainder of this article. 
III. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT FOR HARM TO NON-COMMERCIAL 
LIVING NATURAL RESOURCES 
Perhaps the most interesting problem posed by Zoe Colocotroni 
was damage assessment. At the heart of this problem were two key 
factors: (1) the Puerto Rico statute enabling the EQB to bring suit is 
extremely vague with regard to damage assessment;114 and (2) the 
damaged natural resources had no commercial or market value. 
These two factors combined to make the issue of damage assessment 
difficult and intriguing. In essence the question faced by the court 
was: in the absence of statutory instructions, how should a court 
assess damages for harm to non-commercial living natural re-
sources? 
112. Maine v. MIV Tamano, 357 F. Supp. 1097, 1102 (D. Me. 1973). 
113. Of course, this conclusion holds only when the state's legislature has not authorized a 
statutory cause of action that precludes the bringing of a common law suit. 
114. The relevant Puerto Rico statute is P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 12 § 1131(29) (1977). It is set 
out in full at note 29 infra. 
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A. The District Court's Opinion 
The district court found that plaintiffs' proven claim of damage to 
marine organisms covered "an approximate area of about [twenty] 
acres in and around the West Mangrove." 115 The court found fur-
ther, that surveys conducted by the plaintiffs "reliably establish[ed] 
that there was a decline of approximately 4,605,486 organisms per 
acre as a direct result of the oil spill."116 Thus the total number of 
marine organisms killed was placed at 92,109,720.117 With regard to 
the destruction of mangroves, the district court found that the 
"sediments in and around the West Mangrove continue to be im-
pregnated with oil . . . . The most affected spots in the West 
Mangrove cover an area of approximately 23 acres."118 
In awarding damages for this harm, the district court held that 
restoration or replacement costs provided the best measure of the 
quantum of damage sustained by Puerto Rico: 
We recognize that no market value, in the sense of loss of 
market profits, can be ascribed to the biological components of 
the Bahia Sucia ecosystem. The Court will thus refer to market 
cost as the most reliable evidence of the quantum of damages ac-
tually sustained, i.e., what is required to make the Plaintiffs 
whole. This will comprise the cost of restoring the affected areas 
to the condition in which they were before the occurrences. 119 
Thus, with little discussion, the district court awarded plaintiffs 
the cost of replacing the damaged marine organisms and mangrove 
trees. With regard to the marine organisms, the court arrived at a 
replacement cost figure by referring to biological supply catalogs. 120 
According to the district court, these catalogs established that the 
"lowest possible replacement cost figure [was] $.06 per animal, with 
many species selling from $1.00 to $4.50 per individual."121 Using 
the lowest replacement cost figure ($.06), the court awarded 
damages in this area totalling $5,526,583.20.122 
115. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1344 (D.P.R. 
1978). 
116. [d. 
117. [d. (20 x 4, 605, 486). 
118. [d. at 1345. 
119. [d. at 1344-45 n.42 (emphasis added), citing, Feather River Lumber Co. v. United 
States, 30 F.2d 642, 644 (9th Cir. 1929). 
120. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1344 (D.P.R. 
1978). 
121. [d. at 1344-45. 
122. [d. at 1345 ($.06 x 92,109,720). 
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As for the restoration of the mangrove trees, the district court 
held that "these areas can best be reestablished by the intensive 
planting of mangrove .... "123 The court determined that this 
would cost $16,500 per acre. 124 In addition, the court ruled that the 
planting would require a five year monitoring and fertilizing pro-
gram at a cost of $36,000 per year, or $180,000 for the five years.125 
Thus, the district court awarded a total of $559,500 in damages for 
the destruction of the mangrove trees. 126 When added to the 
$5,526,583.20 awarded for the harm to marine organisms, the total 
restoration costs awarded by the district court came to 
$6,086,083.20.127 
B. The Circuit Court's Opinion 
It was noted earlier that the circuit court held that the EQB's 
statutory cause of action replaced any common law cause of action 
which Puerto Rico might have had.128 Thus, in dealing with damage 
assessment, the circuit court was limited to the EQB's statutory 
cause of action. This meant that the court had to focus on the 
language of the EQB's enabling statute.129 Unfortunately, section 
1131(29) is extremely vague in the area of damage assessment. The 
relevant portion of the statute states only that the EQB is em-
powered to bring "civil actions for damages in any court of Puerto 
Rico or the United States of America to recover the total value of the 
damages caused to the environment and/or natural resources .... 130 
Given the statutory language, it is understandable that the issue of 
damage assessment was so hotly disputed in Zoe Colocotroni. The 
phrase "total value of the damages caused to the environment and/or 
natural resources" is patently ambiguous. It gives no guidelines or 
suggestions whatsoever to a court on how to assess damages; conse-
123. [d. 
124. [d. This brought the cost of replanting 23 acres to $379,500. The court based its 
calculation of the cost of restoring the mangroves on the testimony of one of plaintiffs' ex-
perts, Charles Pennock, a San Juan nurseryman. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe 
Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 659 (1st Cir. 1980). 
125. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1345 (D.P.R. 
1978). 
126. [d. ($379,500 + $180,000). 
127. [d. The district court also awarded $78,108.89 in cleanup costs (which were not 
disputed by the defendants). This brought the total damage award to $6,164,192.09. 
128. See text at notes 46-48 supra. 
129. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 12 § 1131(29) (1977). Hereinafter this statute will be referred to in 
the text as "section 1131(29)." The statute is set out in full at note 29 supra. 
130. [d. 
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quently, each side in Zoe Colocotroni devoted substantial energy to 
promoting its own theory of damage assessment. 
The defendants in Zoe Colocotroni argued that in a civil suit for 
harm to property, rather than to a person, there were only three 
recognized legal theories under which Puerto Rico, through the 
EQB, could recover damages: (1) diminution in the market value of 
the property, or the cost of restoration, whichever was less; (2) loss 
of profits; or (3) loss of use of real or personal property.131 Defend-
ants claimed that since the damaged mangroves and marine organ-
isms had no commercial value or use,132 then theories (2) and (3) 
above were not applicable. Thus, the defendants asserted that dam-
ages had to be limited to either the diminution in market value of 
property affected by the oil spill, or the cost of restoration, which-
ever was less. On this point, the defendants introduced evidence that 
property in the vicinity of Bahia Sucia had been sold at prices rang-
ing from $3,000 to $5,670 per acre.133 The defendants claimed that 
since the marine organisms and mangrove trees had no market 
value, then damages could in no way exceed $5,670 per acre.134 
Defendants' argument certainly has some merit. Section 1131(29) 
says only that the EQB can recover the "total value of the damages 
caused to the environment and/or natural resources."136 In actions 
involving harm to property rather than to a person, the diminution in 
value rule is the traditional means of calculating damages.136 Thus, it 
is reasonable to assert that the "total value" of the EQB's damages 
should be measured by the diminution in value rule. 
131. Brief for Appellants at 61, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 
F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980). These are the three traditional theories of recovery used in civil suits 
involving damages to property. See, e.g., Robie v. Ofgant, 306 F.2d 656 (1st Cir. 1962) (lost 
benefits under dealership agreement); Associated Stations, Inc. v. Cedars Realty and Develop-
ment Corp., 454 F.2d 184 (4th Cir. 1972) (tenant damage to leased premises); McBrayer v. 
Teckla, Inc., 496 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1974) (lost profits); Big Rock Mountain Corp. v. Stearns 
Roger Corp., 388 F.2d 165 (8th Cir. 1968) (damages for defective gondola support assessed at 
cost of restoration plus loss of use); American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Connecticut Light 
& Power Co., 470 F. Supp. 105 (D. Conn. 1979) (damages for loss of use of underground 
telephone cable); DeArmon v. St. Louis, 525 S.W.2d 795 (Mo. 1975) (diminution in value test 
for damage to building). 
132. Plaintiffs admitted that there was no open market for the mangrove trees and marine 
organisms, and that they could not have sold or used them. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. 
SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 673 (1st Cir. 1980). 
133. Brief for Appellants at 61, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 
F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980). 
134. [d. 
135. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 12 § 1131(29) (1977). 
136. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 929(1)(a) (1979). Of course, in an appropriate 
case, where restoration costs are reasonable, such costs can be the measure of damages. 
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On the other hand, plaintiffs in Zoe Colocotroni argued that 
damages should not be limited by the traditional diminution in value 
rule. They claimed that to limit damages to diminution in market 
value would be "entirely inappropriate for measuring the general 
damage society suffers when valuable living, but non-commercial 
resources are destroyed."l37 The plaintiffs noted that Puerto Rico, 
through the EQB, was not claiming injury as the owner of market-
able or commercially valuable property. Rather, the claim was for in-
jury to the natural environment of Puerto Rico. l3s According to the 
plaintiffs, the best measuring stick of the quantum of damages ac-
tually sustained by Puerto Rico, and the only way to "make the plain-
tiffs whole," was to assess damages at the cost of restoring the af-
fected area to its condition prior to the oil spill.l39 
The circuit court divided the issue of damage assessment into two 
sub-issues: (1) whether damages should be limited to the amount 
recoverable under the diminution in value rule; and (2) whether 
plaintiffs were entitled to the over $6 million in damages awarded by 
the district court.l40 These issues could be labelled respectively, 
"Theory of Damage Recovery," and "Calculation of Damages." The 
following sections will examine these two issues. 
1. Theory of Damage Recovery 
The circuit court ruled that damages should not be limited by the 
diminution in value rule. The court held that "implicit" in the 
language of section 1131(29), specifically in the phrase "total value 
of the damages," was 
a determination not to restrict the state to ordinary market 
damages .... In enacting section 1131, Puerto Rico obviously 
meant to sanction the difficult, but perhaps not impossible, task 
of putting a price tag on resources whose value cannot always be 
measured by the rules of the market place. Although the diminu-
tion rule is appropriate in most contexts, and may indeed be ap-
propriate in certain cases under section 1131, it does not 
137. Brief of Amici Curiae at 25, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 
F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980). 
138. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 673 (1st Cir. 
1980). 
139. Brief for Appellees at 47-57, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 
F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980). 
140. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 670, 672-78 (1st 
Cir.1980). 
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measure the loss which the statute seeks to redress in a context 
such as the present. 141 
This interpretation of section 1131(29) is certainly open to ques-
tion. It has been noted repeatedly that the statute merely says, 
"total value of the damages caused to the environmental and/or 
natural resources."142 The circuit court read into this language a 
determination by the Puerto Rico legislature not to restrict the Com-
monwealth to ordinary market damages. However, given the am-
biguity of the statutory language, it is at least arguable that "total 
value" should be calculated by routinely applying the diminution in 
value rule. 
The circuit court gave two reasons for its interpretation of section 
1131(29). First, the court cited the course of recent federallegisla-
tion in the area of oil pollution. The court noted, for example, that 
the Clean Water Act of 1972143 provided only that the United States 
could recover cleanup costs after an oil spill, and made no explicit 
reference to environmental damages.144 The Clean Water Act 
Amendments of 1977, however, significantly expanded the scope of 
a vessel owner's potential liability. The federal government and the 
states were authorized to recover "costs or expenses incurred. . . in 
the restoration or replacement of natural resources damaged or 
destroyed as a result of a discharge of oil or a hazardous sub-
stance . . . ." 145 The circuit court also cited language from a 
number of other federal statutory provisions-language which in-
dicates a recent Congressional determination to authorize the 
federal government and the states to recover costs incurred in 
restoring or replacing natural resources, including marine life, which 
are damaged by a discharge of oil or other hazardous substance.146 
141. [d. at 673-74. 
142. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 12 S 1131(29) (1977). 
143. Pub. L. No. 92-500, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. S 311, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified at 33 U.S.C. 
S 1321(f) (1976». 
144. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 673 (1st Cir. 
1980). 
145. 33 U.S.C. S 1321(f)(4) (Supp. I 1977). 
146. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 673-74 (1st Cir. 
1980). The provisions cited by the circuit court included 33 U.S.C. S 1321(a)(8) (1976), and 33 
U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5) (Supp. I 1977). The former includes as recoverable removal costs the ex-
pense "of such ... actions as may be necessary to minimize or mitigate damage to the public 
health or welfare, including, but not limited to, fish, shellfish, wildlife, and public and private 
property, shorelines, and beaches." 33 U.S.C. S 1321(a)(8) (1976). The latter states that: 
The President, or the authorized representative of any State, shall act on behalf of 
the public as trustee of the natural resources to recover for the costs of replacing or 
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The circuit court reasoned that the federal statutes gave "some in-
dication that Congress has determined that it is desirable to provide 
for environmental damages apart from the commercial loss, or-
dinarily measured by a market value yardstick, suffered by land-
owners and/or exploiters of natural resources."147 The court con-
cluded that in light of this recent federal statutory activity, section 
1131(29) must be read as not limiting damages to the amount 
recoverable under the diminution in value rule. 
It is difficult to understand why the circuit court chose to discuss 
this federal legislation. The EQB's suit was based solely on its enabl-
ing statute, not on any of the federal statutes discussed by the circuit 
court. Moreover, the federal statutes are not good authority for in-
dicating the intent of the Puerto Rico legislature. The circuit court 
presented no evidence whatsoever that the Puerto Rico legislature 
agreed with the recent federal legislative developments. The rele-
vant portion of section 1131(29) was drafted in 1970,148 and since 
then the Puerto Rico legislature has not seen fit to modify its 
language. The circuit court's discussion apparently assumed that, 
given the recent federal enactments, the intention of the Puerto Rico 
legislature would be to have the phrase "total value of the damages" 
interpreted as not limiting recovery to those damages recoverable 
under the diminution in value rule. While this assumption may be 
correct, it should not be made without some concrete evidence that 
the Puerto Rico legislature did in fact agree with the approach taken 
in these recently enacted federal statutes. In the absence of such 
evidence, the circuit court's reasoning is unpersuasive. 
However, the circuit court did present another reason for its inter-
pretation of section 1131(29). The court noted that a strict appiica-
tion of the diminution in value rule in cases such as Zoe Colocotroni, 
restoring such resources. Sums recovered shall be used to restore, rehabilitate, or ac-
quire the equivalent of such natural resources by the appropriate agencies of the 
Federal government, or the State government. 
33 u.s.c. § 1321(f)(5) (Supp. I 1977). 
In addition, the circuit court quoted a section of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act 
which provides that sums the state recovers "shall be available for use to restore, rehabilitate, 
or acquire the equivalent of such natural resources by the appropriate agencies of . . . the 
State, but the measure of such damages shall not be limited by the sums which can be used to 
restore or replace such resources." 43 U.S.C. S 1813(b)(3) (Supp. II 1978). 
147. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 674 (1st Cir. 
1980). 
148. Section 1131(29) was last amended in 1973, but the phrase "total value of the damages 
caused to the environment and/or natural resources" was unaffected by the amendments. 
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where the natural resources have no commercial value, "would deny 
the state any right to recover meaningful damages for harm to such 
areas, and would frustrate appropriate measures to restore or reha-
bilitate the environment." 149 This, the court said, would violate the 
"manifest intent" of Puerto Rico's environmental statUte. ISO 
Although the circuit court determined this "intent" solely by inter-
preting the phrase "total value of the damages" in light of recent 
federal legislation, the court's conclusion appears sound." Section 
1131(29) is part of Puerto Rico's "Public Policy Environmental 
Act."151 The "purpose clause" of this Act states that one of the ma-
jor purposes of the Act is "to develop the efforts which might hinder 
or eliminate damages to the environment . . . ." 152 This purpose 
clearly would not be served if the diminution in value rule was ap-
plied in every civil suit for environmental damages. In cases involv-
ing damage to non-commercial natural resources, such as Zoe Colo-
cotroni, the application of the diminution rule would not provide the 
state with meaningful damages. Many natural resources have impor-
tant ecological value, but are not commercially valuable. 15s As the 
circuit court noted: 
In recent times, mankind has become increasingly aware that 
the planet's resources are finite and that portions of the land and 
sea which at first glance seem useless, like salt marshes, barrier 
reefs, and other coastal areas, often contribute in subtle but 
critical ways to an environment capable of supporting both 
human life and the other forms of life on which we all depend. 164 
Such resources could be freely destroyed if a court could look no fur-
ther than to market value in awarding damages. ISS This would be 
contrary to the "purpose clause" of Puerto Rico's Public Policy En-
vironmental Act, because when a polluter is able to avoid paying 
149. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 673 (1st Cir. 
1980). 
150. [d. at 674. 
151. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 12 S 1121 (1977). This is the official "short title" of the Act. 
152. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 12 S 1122 (1977). 
153. In Zoe Colocotroni, for example, the damaged marine organisms and mangrove trees 
were not traded commercially, but they were vital links in the aquatic food chain. Common' 
wealth of Puerto Rico V. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327, 1339 (D.P.R. 1978); Brief of 
Amici Curiae at 22, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico V. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (1st 
Cir. 1980). 
154. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico V. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 674 (1st Cir. 
1980). 
155. In Zoe Colocotroni, plaintiffs' recovery would be limited to the diminution in market 
value of the swampland. There would be no damages awarded for the destruction of the 
marine organisms. 
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damages for the harm he caused, he has no incentive to take steps to 
eliminate the problems which caused the pollution, and the state is 
denied funds it could have used to help restore or rehabilitate its en-
vironment.166 Therefore, in order to advance the purpose of Puerto 
Rico's Public Policy Environmental Act, damages should not be 
limited to the amount recoverable under the diminution in value rule. 
Moreover, this same conclusion should hold true for common law 
damage suits brought by a state,167 even though the statutory policy 
discussed above would not be present in such actions. Courts have 
refused to limit damages to the amount recoverable under the 
diminution in value rule in common law actions where the property 
has a special value to the injured party that is not reflected in its 
market value.16S Whether a state brings suit under a statutory cause 
of action or a common law cause of action, it is equally entitled to a 
meaningful damage recovery. The diminution in value rule simply is 
not an adequate measure of damages when natural resources of 
ecological value, but with no market value, are destroyed. The 
following section will discuss alternative means of calculating 
damages in such cases. 
2. Calculation of Damages 
Having reached the conclusion not to limit damages to the amount 
recoverable under the diminution in value rule, the circuit court in 
Zoe Colocotroni had to decide whether the district court's damage 
award of over $6 million in restoration costs was appropriate. The 
court stated that its task was to "ascertain what a fair and equitable 
damages measure would be in these circumstances."169 With only 
the phrase "total value of the damages caused to the environment 
and/or natural resources"160 to work with, the circuit court once 
156. Admittedly, given the technology available today, in many oil spill cases it is not possi-
ble for the state to restore the affected area to its pre-existing condition. See note 178 infra. 
Nevertheless, the state can usually undertake some limited restoration measures, and con-
ceivably it could channel the money into research to improve the state of the art, thus making 
it possible to fully restore an affected area in th~ future. 
157. This article has argued that a state had the right to bring a common law action (as 
"public trustee," and in its "parens patriae" capacity) to recover damages for the harm to liv-
ing natural resources. See text at notes 19-113 supra. 
158. See, e.g., Rector, Wardens and Vestry of St. Christopher's Episcopal Church v. C.S. 
McCrossan, Inc., 306 Minn. 143,235 N.W. 2d 609 (1975) and cases cited therein; RESTATE· 
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, S 929 Comment b (1979). 
159. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 674-75 (1st Cir. 
1980). 
160. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 12 S 1131(29) (1977). 
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again looked to provisions in recent similar federal statutes for 
guidance. The court noted that there was a "strong emphasis in Con-
gressional oil pollution enactments on the concept of restoration." 161 
Citing language from the 1977 Clean Water Act Amendments,162 
and its legislative history,16S the circuit court held that the ap-
propriate primary standard for determining damages in a case like 
Zoe Colocotroni, where a state's non-commercial natural resources 
are destroyed,164 is: "the cost reasonably to be incurred by the 
sovereign or its designated agency to restore or rehabilitate the en-
vironment in the affected area to its pre-existing condition, or as 
close thereto as is feasible without grossly disproportionate expend-
itures." 166 
The court also ruled, however, that this standard would not be ap-
propriate and should not be applied, unless the plaintiff state 
presents "a practicable plan for actual restoration."166 Noting that 
Puerto Rico, through the EQB, admitted that it had no intention of 
purchasing 92 million invertebrate marine animals for actual in-
troduction into the sediments of Bahia Sucia, and that it would be im-
practical to do since the Bahia Sucia sediments remained con-
taminated with oil and could not support life, the circuit court held 
that the district court erred in awarding restoration costS.167 The cir-
161. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 675 (1st Cir. 
1980). 
162. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(f)(5) (Supp. I 1977). This provision is set out in note 146 supra. 
163. The legislative history states: 
New subsections (f)(4) and (5) [of the Clean Water Act] make governmental expenses 
in connection with damage to or destruction of natural resources a cost of removal 
which can be recovered from the owner or operator of the discharged source under 
section 311. For those resources which can be restored or rehabilitated, the measure 
of liability is the reasonable costs actually incurred by Federal or State authorities in 
replacing the resources or otherwise mitigating the damage. Where the damaged or 
destroyed resource is irreplaceable (as an endangered species or an entire fishery), 
the measure of liability is the reasonable cost of acquiring resources to offset the loss. 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 675 (1st Cir. 1980), 
quoting H.R. CONF. REP. No. 95-830, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 92 reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 4424, 4467. 
164. The circuit court was careful, however, to limit its holding to cases in which the state 
seeking to recover, owns the land on which the living natural resources were destroyed. The 
court ventured no opinion whether a state might have a cause of action for harm to living 
natural resources which lived on privately owned land. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS 
Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652,675,671 nn.22 & 20 (1st Cir. 1980). 
165. [d. at 675. 
166. [d. at 677. 
167. [d. The circuit court also vacated the district court's award of $559,500 for damage to 
the mangrove trees, for basically the same reason: plaintiffs did not show that actual restora-
tion was practicable. [d. at n.25. 
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cuit court pointed out that the case primarily relied upon by the 
district court to support its grant of damages for replacement value, 
Feather River Lumber Co. v. United States, 168 
did not contemplate a purely abstract recovery such as that pro-
posed here, where the theoretical "loss" was worked out in 
terms of what it would cost to buy thousands of creatures which, 
as a practical matter, would never be bought in such a manner 
and could not be expected to survive if returned to their dam-
aged habitat. Rather, the Ninth Circuit was simply willing to 
permit the government to recover its actual and reasonable ex-
pected restoration costs . . . . 169 
Thus, the circuit court vacated the district court's damage award,170 
and ruled that on remand to the district court, the record should be 
reopened on the issue of damages.171 
Before commenting on the circuit court's analysis, it should be 
noted that given the complete lack of statutory guidance with regard 
to damage assessment in Zoe Colocotroni, all of the circuit court's 
statements on the issue have equal applicability to a state's common 
law cause of action for environmental harm. With no statutory in-
structions to look to, the circuit court admitted that its task was to 
"ascertain what a fair and equitable damage measure would be in 
these circumstances,"172 the same task which a court would face if a 
state brought a common law damage suit.173 Thus, the discussion 
168. 30 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1929). In Feather River, the United States brought suit seeking 
damages for a public forest which was destroyed when defendant negligently started a forest 
fire and permitted it to spread onto public land. In affirming judgment for plaintiff, the circuit 
court said that the proper measure of damages for the merchantable timber was the market 
value of the trees, but that the best measure of damages for the young timber growth (which 
had no market value) was the cost of replacing them. fd. at 644. It is apparent from the opinion 
that the United States did intend to restore the area where young growth was killed. fd. at 
643-44. 
169. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 677 (1st Cir. 1980) 
(emphasis added). 
170. Except as to Puerto Rico's undisputed cleanup costs of $78,108.89. 
171. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 678 (1st Cir. 
1980). The circuit court did offer a number of suggestions to the parties and the district court 
on how to approach the question of damage assessment on remand. As alternatives to restora-
tion costs, the court suggested: (1) the cost of acquiring comparable lands for public parks, (2) 
the cost of reforesting a similar proximate site where the presence of oil would not pose the 
same hazard to ultimate success, and (3) the ecological value (in monetary terms) of non-
commercial natural resources. The circuit court also noted that the EQB should still have an 
opportunity to recover some restoration costs if it could develop a practicable plan for actual 
restoration which was not disproportionately expensive. fd. at 696 & n.24. 
172. fd. at 674-75. 
173. "[T]he primary aim in measuring damages is to arrive at compensation, no more and no 
less." McCORMICK, supra note 20, at 560. 
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which follows does not apply solely to the EQB's suit in Zoe Colo-
cotroni; it also applies to common law actions brought by a state as 
"public trustee" or as "parens patriae." 
The circuit court's conclusions in the area of damage assessment 
appear sound. To begin with, the most basic rule of tort recovery is 
that the injured party be placed, as nearly as reasonably possible, in 
the same position he would have been in had there been no tort.174 In 
cases in which a state seeks damage for the destruction of living 
natural resources, which are ecologically valuable but which have no 
market value, the appropriate primary standard for assessing 
damages should be the cost of restoring or replacing the resources. 
This would return the plaintiff state to the position it would have 
been in had there been no damage. However, such a standard would 
not be appropriate in two types of cases: (1) where the cost of restor-
ing the damaged non-commercial natural resources is grossly dispro-
portionate to the harm caused and the ecological values involved;176 
and (2) where actual restoration is not possible or practicable. 
The problem with awarding restoration costs in cases in which the 
cost of restoring the damaged area greatly exceeds the ecological 
value of the damaged resources, is that it places the state in a better 
position than it was in before the tort was committed. This author 
suggests that restoration costs should be classified as "grossly 
disproportionate" when they are three to four times greater than the 
ecological value of the natural resources involved.176 When the 
restoration costs are this disproportionate, it would be inequitable to 
require a defendant to pay the cost of restoring commercially 
valueless resources. A better and fairer solution would be to assess 
damages in the amount of the resources' ecological value. This figure 
could be arrived at through the use of expert testimony. When 
natural resources are damaged or destroyed, it is possible for an ex-
pert to calculate the economic loss to the environment by taking into 
account a combination of "contribution to fisheries, protection of 
erosion, land control, value of wetlands as nurseries, et. al., then 
economically assessing the loss in terms of recreation, fisheries, pro-
174. See McCORMICK, supra note 20, at 560-61. 
175. One method of calculating "ecological value" is discussed below. See test at note 177 
infra. 
176. These figures were chosen because there are instances in which a plaintiff is authorized 
by statute to recover up to three times the damage he sustained. For example, treble damages 
may be recovered in actions for patent infringement, 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1976), and for violation 
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. S 15 (1976). Any recovery exceeding treble 
damages, however, would be utterly inequitable. 
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duction of wood, and aesthetics." 177 Such a method is reasonable and 
desirable because it is based on the damage to the ecosystem as a 
whole, which is exactly the harm for which a state is seeking to 
recover when non-commercial living natural resources are de-
stroyed. 
In the second type of case, where actual restoration of the affected 
area is not possible or practicable,178 a damage award based on 
restoration costs would be purely theoretical. Although it is not 
always possible in tort cases to calculate damages with absolute cer-
tainty, clearly a damage award must be based on something more 
than conjecture. It would be inequitable to require a defendant to pay 
damages for what restoration might have cost. A fairer and more 
meaningful method of assessing damages would be to use the 
"ecosystem approach" discussed above. Another equitable alter-
native would be "the reasonable cost of acquiring resources to offset 
the loss."179 Examples of this would include the cost of acquiring 
comparable lands for public parks, and alternative-site restora-
tion.180 
Admittedly, the approach to damage assessment outlined above is 
far from perfect. The "ecosystem approach" ultimately rests on the 
economic value that the non-commercial living natural resources 
have to man; and ignores any inherent value that the resources may 
have. Moreover, the alternative of assessing damages at the 
"reasonable cost of acquiring resources to offset the loss," illu-
177. Defendant's Post Trial Brief at 21, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colo-
cotroni, 456 F. Supp. 1327 (D.P.R. 1978). See, Dubey & Fidell, The Assessment of Pollution 
Damage to Aquatic Resources: Alternatives to the Trial Model, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 641 
(1979). 
It is interesting to note that the defendants produced an expert at trial who testified that 
under the "ecosystem approach," damages to the Bahia Sucia area amounted to $40,000-
$50,000 per acre. 
178. Zoe Colocotroni is typical of oil spill cases in that direct restoration of the affected area 
often is not feasible. 
The technology available to remove oil and to restock plant and animal communities is 
very limited at present, and development of such a technology would be a long-range 
undertaking . . . . In most instances, the recovery of an ecosystem after an oil spill 
would occur, if at all, only through the slow processes of natural regeneration. 
Wood, Requiring Polluters to Pay for Aquatic Natural Resources Destroyed lYy Oil Pollution, 
8 NAT. RES. LAWYER 545, 598 (1976). 
179. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 676 (1st. Cir. 
1980), quoting H. R. CONF. REP. No. 95-830, 95th Sess. 92, reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo 
& AD. NEWS 4424, 4467. 
180. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico V. SS Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652, 676 (1st. Cir. 
1980). Alternative-site restoration involves rehabilitating a similar site proximate to the af-
fected area (e.g., reforesting nearby land or restocking fish in nearby waters). 
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strates one of man's greatest misconceptions: that where natural 
resources are destroyed, there will always be others that can be 
"bought" to replace them. Despite these shortcomings, though, the 
above methods appear to be the best approaches to damage assess-
ment in civil actions like Zoe Colocotroni. The task of assessing dam-
ages for harm to the environment is an inherently difficult one,181 
and the problems are exacerbated when non-commercial natural 
resources are destroyed. However, the purpose of civil remedies is to 
compensate the injured party for the damage done,182 and this can 
only be accomplished through the use of money damages. In civil 
suits like Zoe Colocotroni, the court must assess the value, in 
monetary terms, of the harm done to the environment. An ideal ap-
proach would be one that recognized an inherent value in living 
natural resources, not necessarily based upon their economic value 
to man, but sadly, there is no way to measure this "inherent worth." 
The methods outlined above are at least a fair and workable means of 
assessing damages. 
In summary, in cases involving harm to a state's living natural 
resources which are ecologically valuable but which have no commer-
cial or market value, the court should assess damages as the cost 
reasonably to be incurred by the state or its designated agency to 
restore or rehabilitate the environment in the affected area to its 
pre-existing condition, provided that: (1) such an award is not grossly 
disproportionate to the harm caused and the ecological values in-
volved; and (2) the plaintiffs present a practicable plan for actual 
restoration. In the event that both of these conditions are not met, 
the court should assess damages by estimating the ecological value 
of the damaged resources. Expert testimony will be required in such 
cases of course. Finally, in cases where the first, but not the second, 
condition is met, the court should consider, as an alternative to the 
"ecosystem approach," assessing damages at the cost of acquiring 
comparable lands for public parks, or alternative-site restoration. To 
be sure, the methods just outlined do not provide that damages will 
be calculated with total certainty, but a court can calculate damages 
under the above standards with at least as much certainty and accu-
racy as a jury determining damages for pain and suffering, or mental 
anguish. 183 
181. See Note, Assessment of Civil Monetary Penalties for Water Pollution: A Proposal for 
Shifting the Burden of Proof Regarding Damages, 30 HASTINGS L. J. 651, 674-79 (1979); Wood, 
supra note 178, at 600-08 (1975). 
182. See note 173 supra. 
183. It is well-established that in tort actions, plaintiffs are entitled to recover damages for 
pain and suffering, and for mental anguish. See, McCORMICK, supra note 20, at 315-19, & § 88. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
States have a vital interest in conserving and protecting their 
natural resources. Whenever a state's resources are damaged or 
destroyed, the state should have the right to bring suit to recover 
damages. Both the state's status as "public trustee" of its natural 
resources, and its capacity as "parens patriae," are sufficient bases 
for a cause of action in such cases. Of course, damage assessment 
will be a recurring problem in these actions, as it is generally difficult 
to assess damages for harm to the quality of the environment. 
However, courts should be guided by the basic principle of tort 
recovery, namely to place the injured party, here the people of the 
state, as nearly as reasonably possible, in the same position they 
would have been in had there been no tort. In cases where the 
damaged natural resources have a commercial or market value, then 
this market value will usually be an adequate measure of damages. 
But, in cases like Zoe Colocotroni, where the harm is to a state's liv-
ing natural resources which are of ecological value, but which have 
no commerical or market value, then market value is a wholly in-
adequate standard for damage assessment. Zoe Colocotroni is note-
worthy because the courts recognized this inadequacy, and pointed 
out that there are alternatives. The best of the alternatives sug-
gested by the circuit court is to assess the ecological value of the 
damaged natural resources and award damages accordingly. Such a 
method is desirable because it is based on the damage to the eco-
system as a whole, which is exactly the harm for which a state seeks 
to recover when non-commercial living natural resources are de-
stroyed. 
